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The promises and pitfalls of applying
computational models to neurological
and psychiatric disorders
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Computational models have become an integral part of basic neuroscience and have facilitated some of the major advances in the
ﬁeld. More recently, such models have also been applied to the understanding of disruptions in brain function. In this review, using
examples and a simple analogy, we discuss the potential for computational models to inform our understanding of brain function
and dysfunction. We argue that they may provide, in unprecedented detail, an understanding of the neurobiological and mental
basis of brain disorders and that such insights will be key to progress in diagnosis and treatment. However, there are also potential
problems attending this approach. We highlight these and identify simple principles that should always govern the use of com-
putational models in clinical neuroscience, noting especially the importance of a clear speciﬁcation of a model’s purpose and of the
mapping between mathematical concepts and reality.
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Introduction
Though frequently implicit, models are ubiquitous in sci-
ence. If successful, they allow us to make complex prob-
lems more tractable by simplifying them to a set of deep,
hidden components that are the main drivers of the visible
phenomena the model attempts to explain. This leads to a
seemingly paradoxical situation: a model must necessarily
neglect many aspects of reality to represent adequately the
deeper causal structure of that reality. Thus, even at the
earliest stages of modelling, we are forced to make two
important assumptions: ﬁrst, that certain aspects of reality
can be ignored because they are irrelevant to the bit of
reality that the model attempts to explain; second, that
there are parts of the model that ‘stand for’ things in a
way that is meaningful and useful (despite the fact that
the model is necessarily an incomplete rendition of reality).
Ultimately, therefore, the value of modelling depends upon
a clear conceptualization of, and adherence to, the map-
pings between the model and reality and this, in turn
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demands a careful consideration of when and where it
applies. Incorrect models can be heuristically useful but
incorrect application of models will be misleading.
In the modern brain sciences, the most powerful models
are computational in nature. Researchers in computational
neuroscience draw on a wide range of disciplines and tools
with the aim of constructing formal mathematical models
of neurobiological and mental processes (Dayan and
Abbott, 2001). The relatively novel approach harnesses
these powerful computational methods and applies them
to psychiatric and neurological disorders (Maia and
Frank, 2011; Montague et al., 2012; Corlett and Fletcher,
2014; Friston et al., 2014; Stephan and Mathys, 2014). It
thus lies at the interface between computational and cogni-
tive neuroscience, psychology, and psychiatry/neurology.
But computational clinical neuroscience is by no means a
homogenous ﬁeld: its models differ in their intended pur-
pose, the mathematical techniques employed, and the level
of explanation they seek, ranging from mechanistic or pro-
cess models of neural circuits to abstract normative models
of high-level mental function. Despite this heterogeneity,
however, the common hope and promise is that these
models will provide a deeper understanding of the neuro-
biological and mental processes that contribute to psychi-
atric and neurological disorders and, ultimately, be key to
progress in diagnosis and treatment.
While we share the growing enthusiasm for explicitly
modelling the processes of the mind, and their disruptions,
in mathematical and computational terms, we cannot help
but notice an evolving feeling of disorientation and puzzle-
ment in some observers of the ﬁeld. In particular, there
seems to be a growing sense that computational psychiatry
in particular, while developing in several different direc-
tions at once, is making assertions that are often highly
mutable, opaque, and, paradoxically, given the intentions,
inexact. Here, therefore, we scrutinize afresh the general
nature of modelling and ask ourselves how we may deter-
mine whether our models are serving us or misleading us.
We begin by outlining what we consider to be the three
most important beneﬁts of computational models in psych-
iatry, neurology and, indeed, clinical neuroscience gen-
erally: (i) enforcing rigour and precision in the
formalization of conceptual models; (ii) inspiring useful
new conceptualizations of known phenomena and provid-
ing a principled means of synthesizing disparate pieces of
evidence by helping to identify core principles of brain dis-
orders; and (iii) offering a means of bridging the gap be-
tween different levels of explanation all the way from basic
neurobiology to conscious experience of suffering. Such
powerful insights can, if generalized, offer profound new
ways to make predictions about the brain but the potential
beneﬁts come with serious challenges, which we will high-
light. We will identify key principles and criteria, which,
though well known in the ﬁeld of modelling, are easily
neglected with appreciable cost. By applying these prin-
ciples scrupulously, we argue, the researcher can harness
the power of the modelling approach while avoiding the
dangers of drawing unwarranted inferences.
The value of computational
models in understanding
brain function and
dysfunction
Below, we discuss three consequences of using computa-
tional models that we believe are most relevant for clinical
neuroscience, and illustrate these with a simple analogy in
Box 1 and Fig. 1.
Enforcing precision through
formalization
The formalization of existing conceptual models in math-
ematical terms is a way in which computational models
contribute to our understanding of processes in the mind
and brain. Formal models provide several important advan-
tages over purely conceptual ones. First, conceptual models
that are phrased exclusively in linguistic terms inevitably
carry a certain amount of vagueness and ambiguity, inde-
pendently of how advanced and detailed the technical ter-
minology used to express them. In the ideal situation, the
act of translating conceptual ideas into mathematical terms
enforces a rigorous and precise way of thinking that adds
speciﬁcation to the conceptual model. It is particularly
useful in forcing the researcher to explicitly specify which
components are relevant (and which are irrelevant) and
how these components are related. Often this has the add-
itional beneﬁt of helping to uncover implicit assumptions
that might remain unnoticed without such formalizations.
To illustrate, consider the experimentally measured ten-
dency of individuals with schizophrenia to sample less evi-
dence than healthy controls before reaching a decision
when confronted with a probabilistic, uncertain environ-
ment. Since its initial discovery (Huq et al., 1988), this
jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias has received a large
amount of attention (Fear and Healy, 1997; Garety et al.,
2005; Corcoran et al., 2008) as an interesting and in-
formative phenomenon in developing our understanding
of delusional thinking. A widely accepted hypothesis as-
sumes that the JTC bias reﬂects an expectation of high
costs for sampling new pieces of information. However, a
recent mathematical formalization that explicitly modelled
sampling costs as one of the variables underlying decision-
making suggests that this view, which implicates a differ-
ence in subjective motivational factors, is not supported by
a more carefully formalized model (Moutoussis et al.,
2011). Rather, the model indicates that noise in decision-
making is a key factor in the JTC bias. While the nature of
this noise and its precise alteration in delusions, is not yet
clear, it may be that it reﬂects neural noise, known to be a
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key factor in neural information processing and previously
ignored in the JTC. The key point here is that its import-
ance in explaining the JTC bias had been easily overlooked
until a quest for an explicit formalisation of the bias ruled
out an alternative view and demanded its consideration.
Another illustration of the usefulness of computational
models in shaping our understanding of brain disorders
comes from neurological work that evaluates the conse-
quences of lesions to brain areas involved in high-level
vision (Plaut and Behrmann, 2011; Behrmann and Plaut,
2012). Addressing the debate about whether visual recog-
nition is carried out in dedicated, category-speciﬁc modules
or general-purpose mechanisms, Plaut and Behrmann
(2011) constructed an artiﬁcial neuronal network of face
and word recognition. Rather than supporting either inter-
pretation—dedicated, category-speciﬁc modules versus gen-
eral purpose mechanisms—the simulation combines these
views and shows how a graded specialization of com-
puter-simulated brain areas emerges naturally as a conse-
quence of general computational principles. Without the
computational model, it would have been most likely
more difﬁcult to clearly specify such a middle-ground solu-
tion to the debate. Importantly, based on this model, the
authors predicted a speciﬁc pattern of face and word pro-
cessing impairments in prosopagnosia and pure alexia,
which was subsequently conﬁrmed empirically (Behrmann
and Plaut, 2012).
These examples illustrate the crucial heuristic value of
computational models and their use as a tool for structur-
ing our thoughts and explanations. It demonstrates how
readily computational formulations offer and encourage
an ever more detailed and quantitatively precise character-
ization of neurobiological, behavioural, and mental pro-
cesses, highlighting the potential importance of previously
ignored parameters, suggesting new experiments, and more
sophisticated explanatory frameworks. Such an iterative
process is likely to be crucial as neurology, neuropsych-
ology, and psychiatry strive towards a more mechanistic
understanding of symptoms. In psychiatry, this is particu-
larly important in helping to critically review its diagnostic
categorizations from the perspective of a dimensional ap-
proach to illnesses of the mind and brain (Montague et al.,
2012) (also see Box 2). The fact that existing diagnostic
categories group biologically heterogeneous syndromes,
with potentially different pathophysiological mechanisms,
into one disorder constitutes a real obstacle to developing
an understanding of the neurobiological underpinnings of
mental illness (Cuthbert and Insel, 2013). Explanations
based on computational models seek to go deeper than
current conceptualizations, with the aim of describing
these symptoms at lower levels, and thereby uncovering
potential mechanisms underlying symptom clusters inde-
pendent of diagnostic category. Thus, computational
models may be a necessary prelude to an improved classi-
ﬁcation system in psychiatry (Box 2).
Box 1 Benefits of computational modelling: a simple physical analogy
This example aims to illustrate what we might aspire to in developing our models of brain function with a simple analogy. In addition, it helps to
highlight the core principles of computational modelling and the perils of departing from them (Fig. 1).
Suppose that you are interested in training a runner. You want to know how good she currently is, how she compares to other athletes, whether she is
performing at her optimal level or could benefit from a training regimen and, if so, how this might best be structured. You might begin with a very
simple—but workable—conceptualization of her ‘fitness’, perhaps defined as how far she might run at a given speed and you might note that the more
your athlete runs, the fitter she gets. But, after a time, she reaches a point where there is no further improvement. Has she reached her limit? How
might a more formal, mathematically-informed approach help you to determine this and to find ways of producing further improvements?
(i) Developing rigor and precision
In setting up a more complex model of what makes good runners, you would gain important benefits. It would encourage you to identify more
precisely the key components (at multiple levels) of the act of running. You may come to see the relevance of the biomechanics of her running—such as
stride length and cadence—as well as muscle and fat distribution, cardiovascular markers and subjective factors such as pain and motivation. More
detailed measurements could provide markers for underlying metabolic processes—her maximal oxygen consumption and her lactate threshold as well
as microanatomical factors such as proportions of slow- and fast-twitch muscle fibres. Importantly, through mathematically modelling these variables
and, in particular, how they relate to each other, you have gained a much deeper understanding that might allow you to identify important, but
previously unconsidered, factors driving performance. The model provides too a more powerful tool to assess the impact of different training regimens.
(ii) A new conceptualization
The original simple conceptualization of fitness (maximum distance covered at a given pace) captures some aspects of the athlete’s ability but it only
indirectly captures her race performance. In drawing together the biomechanical, biochemical and physiological levels in a mathematical model you find
that a more useful conceptualization emerges, one that has much greater capacity to distinguish between runners. For example, her ‘running economy’
(Barnes and Kilding, 2015) (amount of oxygen consumed per kg per min), may be more suitable for your purposes, offering both a predictive measure
and one that you can focus on in improving her training.
(iii) Bridging the gaps
This new conceptualization, and the modelling process that generated it, provides a link across multiple levels of description of the act of running: the
biomechanical, the neuromuscular, the biochemical and the physiological. All factors may play a part, both separately and through their interaction, in
determining oxygen consumption per kg per min. Exploring its mathematically-defined relationships to changes at these many levels may offer new and
powerful ways to understand, assess, and, ultimately, change running performance.
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Shaping novel conceptualizations and
syntheses
Concepts derived from computational neuroscience have
often led to exciting new ways of thinking about estab-
lished phenomena in neuroscience more generally. For in-
stance, classic studies in visual neuroscience have shown
how notions derived from information theory (Shannon,
1948; McKay, 2003) can provide compelling functional ex-
planations of the speciﬁc structure of receptive ﬁelds in
many peripheral visual systems (Srinivasan et al., 1982)
or the shape of transfer functions in early visual neurons
(Laughlin, 1981). Moreover, the application of computa-
tional methods has often helped to synthesize disparate
phenomena within a common explanatory framework.
One remarkably successful and classic example of such a
synthesis comes from Rao and Ballard (1999), who demon-
strated that a simulation based on a predictive coding
scheme inspired by information theory reproduced a
number of known receptive ﬁeld effects. As well as showing
the power of feedback modulations in the encoding of nat-
ural images, this model has been enormously inﬂuential in
shaping ensuing experiments—and their interpretations—in
visual neuroscience and beyond. It gives a glimpse of the
unifying potential of computational modelling, a potential
that has played a part in inspiring a remarkable growth in
the use of such models in our attempts to understand brain
dysfunction.
In psychiatry, Fletcher and Frith (2009) recently provided
an integrated account of positive symptoms in
Figure 1 The importance of specifying both the purpose of a model, and the mapping between the model components and
aspects of the ‘real world’. Here, we illustrate the importance of two principles of modelling using the running analogy from Box 1. It is
tempting, when we have identified a reliable measure, one that seems to capture the essence of what we are trying to characterize and that has
predictive value, to make it generally applicable. We may forget or ignore both the elements of the world that we are not including in our model
and, furthermore, the ways in which the components that we are modelling may map to the real world. The figure illustrates how we might use
‘Running Economy’ (the volume of oxygen consumed at steady state running) as described in Box 1 as a predictor of race performance. Having the
figures for oxygen consumption on two athletes allows a direct comparison of how they are likely to fare in competition. Indeed, even if the
measurements were obtained at a range of speeds and on different terrain, the measures may be comparable. Running economy serves as a good
model of running ability. But, as indicated in the figure, it only fulfils this purpose within predefined constraints. For example, it is standard to
measure running economy at a pace that is below that at which a person is near their lactate threshold (the point at which oxygen consumption
cannot keep up with demand) and therefore the model is inadequate if we wish to judge running ability for shorter distance sprints in which lactate
levels are highly relevant (Billat, 1996). Here the mapping between the model and reality has gone wrong because the model is applied for a setting
where its assumptions are no longer relevant or valid. Unless we are explicit about our mapping between model components and reality and the
working assumptions that justify it, our model will ultimately lead us astray. Such error lies not in the model but in how it is used. It should also be
noted that running economy, even when applied under restricted and appropriate circumstances, emerges from a number of complex, interacting
factors that are individually ignored, though each contributes to the overall measure (indicated by straight black arrows). This is not a problem
when running economy is being used for the purpose of predicting running performance but it may become very important if we are using our
model for a different purpose, for example to decide on the best training regimen to improve performance. At this point, the value of the model is
much more influenced by the factors that were previously only an implicit part of the model. Two athletes may have limitations in their running
economy for very different reasons, one due to biomechanical inefficiency arising from flaws in her posture or stride rate, another due to
cardiovascular inefficiency. Each would be rectified by distinct training regimens (as indicated by blue, dotted arrows), which could not be chosen
merely on the basis of running economy. It is the purpose of the model that specifies which components of reality need to be modelled and in how
much detail.
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schizophrenia—hallucinations and delusions—based on
ideas derived from computational neuroscience.
Conceptual models of schizophrenia have largely treated
perception and belief as arising from distinct processes; it
has consequently been hypothesized that hallucinations and
delusions are caused by abnormal perceptual processing
(Maher, 1974), abnormal belief formation (Huq et al.,
1988), or both (Coltheart, 2007). Based on concepts origi-
nating in Bayesian decision theory (Chernoff and Moses,
1959; Berger, 1985; Young and Smith, 2005), and earlier
work implicating prediction error in the emergence of de-
lusional beliefs (Corlett et al., 2007), Fletcher and Frith
(2009) suggested a synthesis of these explanations, arguing
that the unusual perceptual experiences and beliefs in
psychosis can be explained by one core atypicality,
namely a shift in the balance of Bayesian inference within
a hierarchically-organized information processing system.
By identifying a core principle, the model offers a parsimo-
nious explanation for the co-occurrence of hallucinations
and delusions as well as the fact that hallucinations and
delusions are often not clearly distinct from each other.
Moreover, it provides a common framework for under-
standing the emergence of positive symptoms from various
different perspectives, linking levels of explanation that
range from basic neurobiology to the individual phenom-
enology of suffering (see next section).
In this case, ideas derived from computational neurosci-
ence—a multi-level, hierarchical predictive processing
system—militate against a simplistic distinction between
perceptual experience and belief and, by extension, the
dichotomization of positive symptoms into hallucinations
and delusions. Moreover, the model offers encouragement
to move away from static characterizations of symptoms,
suggesting rather that we must consider a dynamic balance
in which prior knowledge is used to make sense of incom-
ing sensory information, which either accords with or chal-
lenges that prior knowledge. This informational
conversation occurs over time and at multiple levels with
the overall system acting in pursuit of optimal predictions.
The same core disturbance can thus give rise to different
symptoms depending on the hierarchical level, at which it
expresses itself. For instance, Teufel and colleagues (2015)
have recently shown that, in both early psychosis and
psychosis-proneness, there is a tendency for visual process-
ing of ambiguous stimuli to show increased reliance on
prior knowledge. While this ﬁnding is speciﬁc to atypical
perceptual experiences rather than psychosis in general, the
authors point out that such an effect, measured at one level
of processing and one point in time, is likely to propagate
up and down the hierarchy, inducing changes to inference
systems at other levels in the brain. This growing and in-
creasingly inﬂuential way of thinking about psychosis
(Aleman et al., 2003; Corlett et al., 2009; Fletcher and
Frith, 2009; Chambon et al., 2011; Adams et al., 2013;
Schmack et al., 2013; Jardri and Dene`ve, 2014; Teufel
et al., 2015; Fineberg and Corlett, 2016) is partly inspired
by new ideas emerging during the search for overarching
neurocomputational models.
Bridging the explanatory gap
A widely held but contentious notion is that computational
techniques might allow researchers to link various levels of
explanation of mental illness ranging from basic neurobio-
logical systems to the phenomenology of speciﬁc symptoms
(Huys et al., 2011; Maia and Frank, 2011; Montague
et al., 2012; Friston et al., 2014). While different levels of
explanation may be independent, as most famously high-
lighted by David Marr (1982), the hope is that computa-
tional models nevertheless will help to constrain and link
descriptions at various levels. This linking of multiple levels
of explanations will be critical in assessing different risk
factors and their interaction in psychiatric illness
(Kendler, 2012), and, while advances so far in this regard
are still speculative and incomplete, the potential for real
progress is there.
As an example, there is a long tradition linking features
of schizophrenia to basic associative learning. In this form
Box 2 Computational modelling giving new perspectives on diagnosis and treatment
One of the most profound challenges facing psychiatry is its reliance on a diagnostic system that is both widely distrusted and criticized and, at the same
time, forms the basis for most research and clinical practice (Cuthbert and Insel, 2013). The central problem is that diagnostic categorizations are based
on phenomenological similarity, often expressed at the level of perception, belief and emotion. Consequently, there is a danger that superficially similar,
but fundamentally different dysfunctions may be grouped together under one category while some categorical distinctions might be based upon
superficial differences that do not actually reflect underlying differences in pathology. The conundrum is reflected in the fact that many researchers
and clinicians now challenge the idea that schizophrenia meaningfully refers to a particular group of people (van Os, 2016) while, conversely, the long-
treasured distinction between schizophrenia and affective disorder is increasingly questioned (Kendell and Jablensky, 2003).
Only through more precise characterizations of mental and brain function can we begin to converge on mechanisms that may allow us to distinguish
between conditions that, despite superficial similarity, are actually fundamentally different. And it is only through identification of such mechanisms that
we can avoid the creation of false distinctions between conditions that, though superficially distinct, are actually overlapping. The three benefits of the
computational approach identified in the text and exemplified in Box 1 therefore become powerful allies in the pursuit of a credible diagnostic system.
To return to the simple running analogy in Box 1, it is easy to see how two runners may show similar levels of fitness or unfitness for different reasons,
and how differences in current fitness might not reflect differences in core abilities. Only through more precise modelling of the underlying factors is it
possible to understand how superficial resemblance may disguise lower level distinctions.
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of learning, knowledge acquisition is thought to be driven
by so-called prediction errors, i.e. the difference between
expected and actually experienced rewards. Of equal im-
portance, schizophrenic symptoms have been linked to
dopaminergic dysfunction (Kapur, 2003). The formaliza-
tion of associative learning in terms of computational
models derived from machine learning (Sutton and Barto,
1998) has been instrumental in relating these two levels of
explanation (Montague et al., 1996). In particular, they
provided the tool to link the formation of delusions to
atypicalities in phasic dopamine via the prediction error
signal that drives learning. For instance, computational
models enabled researchers to relate psychotic symptoms
in an animal model to dopaminergic neurons down to the
receptor level (Smith et al., 2007) and, using functional
MRI in psychotic patients, to abnormal activity in dopa-
minergic neurons in mesolimbic brain structures (Murray
et al., 2008). Moreover, a series of complementary studies
(for reviews see Frank, 2008; Maia and Frank, 2011),
drawing on the advantages of different approaches (cogni-
tive tasks, exploration of patients with known dopamine
dysfunction, functional perturbations using deep brain
stimulation and pharmacological manipulations) have
demonstrated the links between dopaminergic neuronal
populations, regional brain responses, precise cognitive
functions and neuropsychiatric symptoms. Critically, these
studies explored links suggested by, and hypotheses based
on, computational reinforcement-learning models.
Another powerful example of how the key attributes of
computational modelling may be harnessed to provide both
a new conceptualization and an opportunity for multi-level
explanatory insights, ultimately applicable to understanding
neurological dysfunction, is seen in the work of Ueno and
colleagues (2011). Synthesizing a series of existing compu-
tational models, they applied known neuroanatomical con-
straints to generate a mapping between computational
processing and brain anatomy. The ensuing ‘fusion of
neuroanatomy and computation’ provided a new conceptu-
alization with remarkable capacity to shed light on both
normal language function and aphasia.
Challenges
Though we recognize the huge potential offered by apply-
ing computational models to the study of mental and
neurological illness and we share the growing enthusiasm
for the ﬁeld, there is a danger that these models obscure
rather than clarify, and that they may form the basis for
assertions that are frustratingly mutable and inexact.
Consider for example, the application of Bayesian models
to understanding hallucinations. Bayesian models are one
way of formalizing the notion that our perceptual experi-
ence is the result of a combination of sensory evidence with
prior knowledge and expectations of our environment.
There is a growing body of empirical research that supports
the idea that this framework is a useful tool to understand
hallucinations. Yet, the general notion underlying Bayesian
models has been invoked to support several profoundly
different conceptualizations of how hallucinations may
arise. First, an increased weighting of prior expectation in
perception, such that expectations generate inaccurate per-
cepts (Friston, 2005b; Corlett et al., 2009; Fletcher and
Frith, 2009; Frith and Friston, 2013; Teufel et al., 2015),
second, a reduction in the relative weighting of prior ex-
pectation such that it is the relatively stronger bottom-up
signal that generates the aberrant percept (Adams et al.,
2013), and ﬁnally, a circularity in inferential processing
such that a lack of inhibitory control generates a reverber-
ating effect: an expectation enhances a signal which then
acts as additional evidence in favour of that expectation
(Jardri and Dene`ve, 2013, 2014). While some of these
models might not be mutually exclusive, clearly, a compu-
tational framework that is able to encompass such differing
possibilities needs close scrutiny.
A related illustration of the difﬁculties facing the compu-
tational approach to neuropsychiatric illness comes from
work attempting to relate high-level Bayesian models of
brain function to processes at the neuronal level. Under
certain speciﬁc but plausible assumptions, Bayesian
models ﬁnd a natural implementation in predictive coding
schemes. In its original form, predictive coding provides a
functional theory of perceptual processing located at an
intermediate level between low-level mechanistic models
and high-level explanations (Spratling, 2008a, b, 2013;
Huang and Rao, 2011). More recently, some authors
have embarked on a further step, treating predictive
coding schemes as mechanistic models of information pro-
cessing in the brain more generally (Friston, 2005a). This
perspective has been adopted in some models of psychotic
experiences (Adams et al., 2013), perhaps offering the
exciting possibility of making assertions about their precise
neural instantiation. Here, based on a speciﬁc conceptual-
ization of predictive coding, psychotic symptoms are
thought to be a consequence of abnormal neuromodulation
of post-synaptic gain of superﬁcial pyramidal cells. This is
an admirably precise and speciﬁc assertion and it depends
on a correspondingly precise conceptualization of predictive
coding. However, given that predictive coding is a func-
tional scheme, other conceptualizations are possible
(Spratling, 2013; Kogo and Trengove, 2015). Indeed, it
has been demonstrated that an alternative predictive
coding model that, in some respects, is based on the op-
posite assignment between mathematical concepts and
neurobiological implementation is not only mathematically
equivalent to the model mentioned above but is well-sup-
ported by empirical data (Spratling, 2008a,b, 2010).
The above example simultaneously illustrates the promise
of the computational approach to clinical neuroscience and
the challenges inherent in the move towards drawing to-
gether a theory (Marr’s computational level) and a speciﬁc
implementation of that theory (Marr’s physical level)
(Marr, 1982). The promise lies in the opportunity to ex-
plore computational ideas in terms of their neural
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mechanisms and the challenge is to avoid overburdening a
model with interpretations that it cannot unambiguously
support. Computational neuroscience offers us the tools
and the framework to identify and resolve the discrepancies
and ambiguity that the approach itself throws up.
However, in order for the ﬁeld to advance, it will be critical
not to stretch the explanatory power of models beyond a
certain point. This brings us back to the importance of
being clear on what the purpose of our speciﬁc models is,
which components of reality we are choosing (and neglect-
ing) in building them, and in what sense the components of
the model represent reality.
A principled approach
In its ideal form computational modelling provides novel
and powerful tools to shed light on information-processing
atypicalities in neurological and mental illness. However,
the approach also comes with difﬁculties and ambiguities.
We suggest that many pitfalls could be avoided through use
of two relatively simple and well-established, but often neg-
lected, principles of modelling (Bender, 1978). The ﬁrst is
that it is vital to specify clearly the purpose of a model and
its role in the explanatory process (Fig. 1). For instance,
normative optimality models that can act as a benchmark
against which to compare human performance, of course,
serve a different purpose from mechanistic models of
neurobiological or mental processes, or simulations that
are supposed to provide a proof of principle (Maloney
and Mamassian, 2009). An important aspect of the process
of clarifying a model’s purpose is a speciﬁcation of the level
of explanation or description at which the model represents
reality. Second, and very closely related to the ﬁrst point, is
the importance of an explicit treatment of the mapping
between mental or neurobiological process and
mathematical concept (Fig. 1). It is important to note
(Box 3) that we distinguish between a model being wrong
in useful and in useless, or misleading, ways. A model need
not be right (or indeed complicated) to be useful nor should
it be constrained to such a degree that it cannot be used to
generalize and predict beyond the conﬁnes of its initial ap-
plication. However, its use must always align with the
question or purpose that it is used for, and its relevance
must be continuously evaluated. Only if it is very clear
which mathematical concept ‘stands for’ which aspect of
reality, can the validity of the model truly be assessed. In
particular, the mathematical concepts need to be carefully
chosen in such a way that they capture those aspects of
reality that are essential to the chosen purpose of the
model. Ultimately, the usefulness of a computational
model is limited by how meaningful the relationship is be-
tween linguistically expressed concepts of reality and math-
ematical terms.
Concluding remarks
The use of computational models to understand brain func-
tion and its disruption is an exciting development. It prom-
ises to provide insights, in unprecedented detail, to
psychological and neurobiological subsystems that go
awry in disorders of the mind and brain, laying the foun-
dation for the development of novel diagnostic systems and
treatments that accurately reﬂect underlying causes. But the
approach carries too the power to mislead and a mature,
and ultimately successful use of computational models re-
quires a detailed appreciation of their strengths and limita-
tions as well as the simple principles that govern this use.
Foremost, we must repeatedly ask ourselves, what are we
modelling, how do our model components relate to reality
and, crucially, what are we leaving out?
Box 3 Simple, general, and breakable: three useful properties of a good computational model
Good computational models are often simple. To be useful in the generation of explanations, models have to reach beyond the confusing diversity of
reality and identify key causal components. Indeed, the process of simplification is itself useful. The act of choosing which parts of reality to include and
which to exclude demands that the modeller is explicit about the model’s assumptions and limitations. Though computational modelling should strive
for specificity and precision, detailed and isolated explanations of specific phenomena may ultimately impose a serious limit on the value of the model.
Rather, one of the main strengths of computational models is their usefulness in uncovering deep organizational principles of a system, achieved by
balancing simplicity with situation-specific accuracy.
The process of simplification thus embodies a quest for more universal principles that extend beyond the current situation. It thereby furthers the
development of an explanatory framework that generalizes across, and provides prediction of, a whole range of phenomena. Such generalization is of
course a hallmark of a successful model. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the process can easily become misleading when a successful
model is applied to new domains without a detailed evaluation of its applicability. Thus, in addition to seeking the balance between simplicity and detail,
we advocate a specific and precise treatment of the relationship between the model’s components and to-be-modelled aspects of reality, and of the
model’s purpose in the explanatory process.
A focus on specificity and precision also does not mean that models should be abandoned if they are unsuccessful. Rather, failures should provide the
impetus for an iterative process of updating, leading to novel experiments and further model development. It may be profoundly useful and informative
for a model to break. Note that only a model that can make specific, testable prediction will be breakable. As with conceptual models, inadequately
specified computational models may bend themselves, appearing to fit a wide range of data and, in doing so, become devoid of the attributes that
ultimately make models useful.
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